

## The Role of the International Multidimensional Peacekeeping Missions in Africa: A Case of Darfur (Sudan)

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**ABSTRACT** Many countries on the African Continent had experienced serious challenges in as far as the peacekeeping missions were concerned. In the main, this was due to the nature of the conflicts and violence experienced by the citizens of those countries. One of such countries was Sudan, particularly its western region of Darfur. Ever since the name 'Darfur' emerged from virtual obscurity to international headlines in 2004, it has turned out to be identical with war, massacre, and humanitarian crisis. Furthermore, this was despite the international indignation and demands around the globe to end violence, the lethal conflict continued. For the purpose of this study, a qualitative and quantitative design was adopted with an aim of documenting and analysing the impact of peacekeeping missions in Darfur. The study examines and critiques the various challenges as experienced by such missions. Available data indicates those peacekeeping missions in Darfur and their sincere interest and participation in daily community life. The authors argue that there was a dualism of interconnected causes for peacekeeping and the violent situations that prevailed in the area. This dualism was between determinism by the peacekeeping missions versus the conflicting groups.

### I. INTRODUCTION

A general definition of peacekeeping is hard to arrive at and in most cases its implementation poses challenges for the affected areas. Peacekeeping is conducted by an international actor which is viewed as any collective configuration, competent to act and influence the global or international system by using power and authority. These actors manoeuvre outside the boundaries of a single country and have influence on the international system. In order to explain the involvement of peacekeeping operations properly, an expanded, holistic and more understanding of peace and conflict is crucial. The existing discourse on conflict is characterised by dichotomy and linear understanding of processes of conflict. Solomon (2006: 220) quotes Samarasinghe who argues that any violent conflict has five basic phases: the pre-conflict phase; the conflict emergence phase; the conflict and crisis phase which is characterised by chaos and complex emergencies; the conflict-settlement phase; and the post-conflict phase.

Based on the above viewpoint, the central questions in this study are as follows: Why are peacekeeping missions needed in the countries such as Darfur? What is the nature of such peacekeeping missions to intervene in the conflicts of Darfur? What are the strategies used in

peacekeeping missions in order to increase the chances of successful peace in the area? How successful are these peacekeeping missions in Darfur? Therefore, in order to answer the above mentioned questions, this article attempts to investigate the role on international multidimensional peacekeeping missions such as the African Union/United Nations Hybrid operations in Darfur (UNAMID) and the European Union (EU). Consequently, it should be noted that placing peacekeeping missions at the centre of maintaining peace implied critical reflections on the political situation in Darfur. Furthermore, the article examines and provides a critique on the role of the above mentioned actors in peacekeeping missions. Finally, what this article seeks to accomplish is the understanding as to whether these operations addressed holistically the needs of peacekeeping or created more problems in the area.

### Literature Review

According to Paris (2002: 27), in the past years, the academic literature on peace missions flourished. This increased since the early 1990s, when the United Nations (UN) launched a flurry of new missions in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. By one measure, the number of articles in academic journals on the subject of

peace missions increased by more than 350 percent from the 1980s to the 1990s. Interestingly, in the mid-1990s, two new scholarly journals sharing the same title, *International Peacekeeping*, came into being. Articles on peacekeeping were regularly published and appeared in the mainstay publications of international relations discipline, including *International Studies Review* and *World Politics*. As Paris (2002: 27) puts it: 'It is noteworthy to indicate that the pragmatic focus of the existing peacekeeping literature is understandable. Improving methods for dealing with civil conflicts and their humanitarian effects remains an important goal for policy makers in national governments and international agencies'.

The above observations by Paris were also confirmed by Andersson (2007: 2) who comments that: 'Much research on peacekeeping has been geared primarily at UN mandates, tactical considerations and institutional involvement. The mode of research has often involved case studies of particular operations, in which description is the chief objective and the focus is generally on traditional UN peacekeeping operations'.

Bellamy (2004: 17-18) contends that scholars within International Relations and International law have studied the legality and legitimacy of intervention, the justifications offered by intervening states, the relationship between peace operations and national interests and the development of new norms and concepts governing responsible sovereignty and human rights. However, one might argue that such approaches offer limited and partial analyses of peace operations.

### **Theoretical Framework for Peacekeeping**

This section analyses the role of international community in peacekeeping by explaining how peacekeeping has become necessary, desirable and possible, despite its growing complexity. This leads to an inquiry about the actual missions of peacekeeping as well as the response of the international community to global security threats and humanitarian crises in domestic systems. Therefore, in order to understand the role of the international community in peacekeeping, the study highlights the views of the realist and idealist schools of thought.

According to Baylis and Smith (2005: 116), the realist school of thought argues that national interest and security should not be sacrificed for ideology, moral concerns and social reconstructions. In the case of Darfur, the question was whether the international peacekeeping missions were driven by their own interests or not. Kegley and Wittkopf (1999: 530) firmly assert that there remains the temptation for members of the UN to assist in only those peacekeeping missions that impinge on their own pressing security interests, be they of an economic or military nature. Therefore, in this context the international community may have specific interests in the continuity or termination of the war, which may or may not be aligned with peace-related motives. This raises questions about the nature of international interest in Darfur. Nel (2006: 49) argues that states act morally when it suits their narrow self-interests and ignore morality when it does not suit their national interests. He goes further to state that from a realist point of view, states are met with a reluctance to choose morality over self-interest. Therefore, states cannot be sure that other states will conform to a common code of moral behaviour since there is no mutual trust. The UN's economic interests in Africa provide an interesting observation. While a peacekeeping mission is regarded as the mandate for the UN, its showing of economic interest in Africa as an organisation can be interpreted as an act of prolonging the conflict for such gains.

The idealist theory on the other hand, realists argues that the actions of individuals and political groups are informed by their narrow self-interest (Nel 2006: 49). The realist perspective assumes that external intervention in intra-state civil wars is often linked to an economic rather than an ideological impetus. One of the economic spurs is oil and other mineral resources which played a role in suppressing or sustaining conflicts, particularly in Africa. International arms merchants who are thought to increase the flow of arms into conflict areas have profited from conflicts in Africa and appear to have little or no interest in ending conflicts (Olonisakin 2006: 272). This was inherent in the case of China which used its seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to become Sudan's diplomatic chief. China had offered Sudan support by threatening to use its veto on the UNSC to protect Khartoum from sanctions,

and has been able to water down every resolution on Darfur in order to protect its interests in Sudan. Human rights advocates and opponents of the Sudanese government portrayed China's role in providing weapons and aircraft as a cynical attempt to obtain oil, just as certain colonial powers once supplied African chiefdoms with the military means to maintain control while they extracted natural resources. Furthermore, realists point out that in international politics, the structure of the system does not permit friendship, trust, and honour amongst member states, thereby reinforcing the assumption that their actions are guided by national interest (Baylis and Smith 2005: 16). This means that states indeed have a hidden agenda when it comes to their relations, in the case of peacekeeping, these states' contributions of troops may be shaped by a perceived long-term interest such as securing oil in Sudan or forming diplomatic partnerships.

#### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The study follows a qualitative approach by including an interpretation of observations for the purpose of discovering underlying meanings and patterns of relationships in the roles of peacekeeping missions in Darfur. The aim is to provide an in-depth understanding in order to determine whether the international peacekeeping missions in the Darfur conflict are effective or not to end the escalation of a war in the region. The inferences are drawn deductively from the historical context of peacekeeping in Africa. The study follows an idiographic approach, whereby the focus is on the phenomenon of peacekeeping in Darfur, to provide an interpretation of the conditions conducive to successful peacekeeping. The methods of data collection include documents in a form of scholarly journals, historical records, publications by various Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), Intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) and other actors. Books and chapter in books written by local and international scholars on the field were also consulted.

#### ISSUE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING MISSION

Different political analysts and historians define the term 'peacekeeping' differently de-

pending on the context in which it is used. Governments and international organisations are prone to label many different kinds of military activity as 'peacekeeping', sometimes in an attempt to legitimize their activities. Although the term 'peacekeeping' was invented in the 1950s, the international management of political violence has a far longer history. As international society's most sustained attempt to work in an organised and usually multilateral fashion to reduce and manage armed conflict, understanding the theory and practice of peacekeeping sheds important light upon trends and developments in global politics more generally.

According to Bellamy et al. (2010: 3), peacekeeping provides important insights into the codes of conduct that states have collectively devised to cope with life in an international society of states. Furthermore, it fosters the relationship between the great powers and the maintenance of international peace and security, and the creation and diffusion of shared norms about the appropriateness of welfare itself and legitimate conduct within wars.

Rubinstein (1993: 553) adds:

*A peacekeeping mission may mean many different things to different people, because each may have a different political understanding of the situation. Peacekeeping operations take place in the context of the daily lives of multiple communities: diplomatic, military, [humanitarian] and local. Each of these communities embodies culturally constituted ways of behaving and understanding the objectives and practices of the operation. Sometimes the intersection of these cultural spheres is problematic.*

International peacekeeping is generally understood as a form of conflict management and later resolution through interventions by a third party to assist the contending parties find a solution without resorting to force. Notable studies show that many international peacekeeping operations' attempts have succeeded in resolving regional and international conflicts and disputes between opponent states/parties without resorting to war. Despite such successes there are some unsuccessful peacekeeping cases on the African continent. The case of Darfur is one example of an unsuccessful peacekeeping mission. It is a known fact that Africa, after the Second World War (WWII) was riddled with intra-state conflicts, especially civil conflicts between

organized groups within the same nation state. Therefore, peacekeeping missions were at the centre of conflict management and resolution (Fortna 2004: 269-270).

Peacekeeping has proven to be one of the most effective tools available to the structures such as the United Nations (UN) in order to assist host countries navigate the difficult path from conflict to peace. It has unique strengths, including legitimacy, burden sharing, an ability to deploy and sustain troops and police from around the globe, and integrating them with civilian peacekeepers to advance multidimensional mandates. For example, the UN Peacekeepers provide security and the political and peace building support to help countries make the easy transition from conflict to peace. Today's multidimensional peacekeeping operations are called upon not to maintain peace and security, but also to facilitate the political process, protect civilians, assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; support the organization of elections, protect and promote human rights and assist in restoring the rule of law. Furthermore, depending on their mandate, multidimensional peacekeeping missions may be required to: assist in implementing a comprehensive peace agreement; monitor a ceasefire or cessation of hostilities to allow space for political negotiations and a peaceful settlement of disputes; provide a secure environment encouraging a return to normal civilian life; prevent the outbreak of conflict across borders; administer a territory for a transitional period, thereby carrying out all the functions that are normally the responsibility of a government (Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations 2003: 2).

The above sentiments were also echoed by Fleck who stated that: 'peacekeeping is a mechanism created to help war-torn states to establish the conditions for lasting peace. Peacekeepers should supervise peace processes in post-conflict countries and assist ex-combatants to implement the peace agreements that had been signed' (Fleck 2008: 32). According to Olonisakin (2006: 274-276), peacekeeping is intended to keep a peace which has been arranged or is about to be concluded through the deployment of troops to contain violence, defuse crises, separate warring parties and create buffer zones. This was mainly done after consent by the host government in which whose state the conflict manifest-

ed. Interestingly, as Derblom et al. (2008: 37) observed, 'a peacekeeping operation can only create stability in a conflict area, but cannot in it create lasting peace'.

The 1992 *An Agenda for Peace*, published by the former UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, argues for proactive peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention (Boutros-Ghali 1992). Murithi states that the above report outlines suggestions for enabling inter-governmental organisations to respond quickly and effectively to threats to international peace and security in the post-Cold War era. In particular, four major areas of activity were identified, namely, preventive diplomacy; peacemaking; peacekeeping; and post-conflict peace-building (Murithi 2009: 2).

Preventive diplomacy strives to resolve a dispute before it escalates into violence. Peacekeeping seeks to promote a ceasefire and to negotiate an agreement. Peacekeeping proceeds after the out-break of violence and involves the deployment of a UN presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving UN military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well (Murithi 2009: 2). Furthermore, according to Murithi, these initiatives ideally are coordinated and integrated in order to ensure post-conflict peacekeeping, which includes the programmes and activities that will sustain the peace and prevent any future outbreak of violent conflict, and may include addressing diplomatic, political, social, military issues as well as reforming the security sector and consolidating economic development (Murithi 2009: 2). According to the *Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations* 'peacekeeping is based on principle that an impartial presence on the ground can ease tensions between hostile parties and create space for political negotiations' (Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations 2003: 1).

### **Reflections on the Darfur's Situation: The Involvement and the Challenges of the Peacekeeping Missions**

#### *The Reflections on the Darfur's Situation*

This section departs from the premise that the external engagement with Darfur must recognise the need to adopt both a historical ap-

proach and a holistic pan-Sudan perspective that takes into account the dynamic interconnections between the country's multiple interlocking conflicts. Sudan where Darfur is situated is geographically Africa's largest country and features great racial, religious, and cultural diversity. Political conflict in Darfur has a long history. Since receiving its independence from Britain in 1956, the Sudanese government has been in a state of civil war with their southern rivals. The conflict between Arab Muslims in the North and African Christians and animists in the South resulted in two civil wars from 1955-1972 and 1983-2002, in which the second civil claimed over 2 million lives (Frazier 2012: 18).

The crisis in Darfur is not an accidental disaster, or a human catastrophe that humanitarian intervention can reverse or solve. The conflict is not as simple as presented in the media, which casts the conflict in terms of Arabs versus black Africans. The reality is far more muddled. It is a human tragedy, brewing for decades that finally erupted into a vicious cycle of violence (Cheadle and Prendergast 2007: 72). The Darfur conflict is not only a problem for the Sudanese, but also a regional problem. The conflict is threatening the stability in other regions of Sudan, and in neighbouring countries like Chad, and the Central African Republic (CAR).

Darfur reflected one of the worst human rights and humanitarian crises in the world. Years of civil war had created a lifestyle characterised by violence, where destruction and retribution were perceived as normal. In February 2003 the rebel groups known as the Sudan Liberation Movement Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) emerged in Darfur and attacked government troops accusing the Sudanese government of oppressing and committing genocide against black Africans. The SLM/A and JEM insisted that Darfur was totally marginalised and demanded better political representation and a share of national wealth as well as security. The government was accused of unleashing Arab tribal militia, known as the *Janjaweed*, against civilians in a campaign of murder, rape and arson. Multiple human rights groups accused the Sudanese government of providing financial support to the *Janjaweed* militia and of taking part in attacks aimed at civilians in Darfur (Frazier 2012: 1).

After several negotiations between the government and the rebel groups involved in the

war facilitated by international actors, a breakthrough came when the N'Djamena peace negotiations of September 2003 and April 2004 were initiated. Subsequent to that other peace negotiations were concluded (El Amin 2010: 92). These included the Addis Ababa peace negotiations of May 2004; the Abuja peace negotiations of August 2004 and May 2006 (Iyob and Khadiaglala 2006: 154-156). Later the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in January 2005 by the government/ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and the SLM/A. To the dismay of the international peacekeeping actors, the agreement was never implemented due to its rejection by the Darfur rebel groups, particularly the JEM (Nathan 2006: 8). Peacekeeping missions had to be embarked upon because by 2007, over 200 000 civilians had been killed and an additional 2.5 million displaced in Darfur due to the continued conflicts. Furthermore, Solomon (2006: 219-234) argues that despite the signing of various peace agreements, lives continued to be lost on the African continent. This was an indication that the peace agreements that were signed such as the one in Darfur were not honoured.

In 2010, a new round of political negotiations on peace in Darfur took place in Doha (Jibril 2010: 19). Since 2010, not much progress has been made with regard to conflict resolution and peacekeeping missions since the beginning of the conflicts. Consequently, this raised questions about the international community's ability to assist the peace process in order to end the conflict.

The implementation of the CPA had reached a critical phase. The agreement established a template for a wide-ranging agenda of political change in Sudan. Its intent extended beyond just the Southern referendum. This referendum, however, had become the accord's defining provision in the eyes of the many Sudanese and the international community. The cost of any failure to implement the CPA would be considerable, not just for Sudan, but also for the country's nine neighbouring states, the rest of Africa and the world at large (Large and Saunders 2010: 6-7). The CPA's two signatory parties, namely, the NCP for the government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPL/M) failed to implement the agreement 'fully and jointly'.

It was interesting to note that six years after the signing of the CPA, in January 2011 disagree-

ments emerged and compromised the whole peace process. Khartoum, the rebel JEM, and the rebel SLM, continue to try to resolve the conflict primarily through a military victory. Inter 'tribal' clashes increased, internally displaced populations continue to suffer amidst political fragmentation, and attacks continue on humanitarian personnel and peacekeepers (Large and Saunders 2010: 7).

### *The Peacekeeping Missions in Darfur*

As stipulated by the UN, peacekeeping missions which started in 1948 were established to help countries which were torn by conflict to create the conditions for lasting peace. At the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping missions evolved beyond resolving armed conflicts. Missions expanded to encompass a broader social and political context. On 18 September 2004, the UN Security Council established the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur via resolution 1564 under chapter VII of the UN Charter. The purpose of the commission was to investigate the incidents occurring in Darfur between September 2003 and January 2005. In 2005, the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur revealed the following from their investigation: 1.65 million Darfuris internally displaced and 200 000 refugees in neighbouring Chad; and the killing of civilians, torture, enforced disappearance, destruction of villages, rape, unlawful arrest and detainment impacting the following Darfuri tribes, Fur, Zaghawa and Massalit (International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur 2005).

According to Frazier (2012: 3-4) the next stage of International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur was to determine if the Sudanese counter-insurgency policy constituted genocide under Article II of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG). After the UN Commission ruling, the case was referred to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for further investigation of the Sudanese government's counter-insurgency policy.

In 2004, the African Union (AU) established the African Mission in Darfur (AMID) which attempted to provide aid and security for Darfur African tribes. In 2005, the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur did not rule the atrocities that were committed in Darfur as genocide; however, the commission referred the case

to the ICC in 2005. In spite of the vast atrocities that were committed in Darfur, the UN commission ruled the Sudanese government policy in Darfur did not constitute genocide (Frazier 2012: 4). It was interesting to note that in May 2006, the UN Security Council proposed that a UN peace keeping force be deployed in Darfur, however, in August 2006, the Sudanese government declined to allow a UN peacekeeping force to enter in Darfur claiming it would compromise Sudanese sovereignty. The government feared that a UN presence could encourage a total breakup of the nation by rebel factions (Frazier 2012: 5).

In July 2007, the Sudanese government agreed to a hybrid African Union-UN peace keeping mission known as the United Nations African Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), thus replacing the AMID in the region. The UNAMID mandate includes: protection of civilians; contributing to security for humanitarian assistance; monitoring and verifying implementation of agreements; assisting an inclusive political process; and contributing to the promotion of human rights and the rule of law. After a three year investigation by the ICC, on 14 July 2008, Luis Moreno Ocampo, prosecutor of the ICC, indicted President Omar al-Bashir of 10 counts for sponsoring war crimes and crimes against humanity under the Rome Statute articles 7(1), 8(1) and 8(f). In March 2009, the ICC issued a warrant for President al-Bashir's arrest. After the ICC issued an arrest warrant for committing war crimes and crimes against humanity in March 2009, President al-Bashir expelled 13 international NGOs from Darfur (Report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur 2009: 1-12).

The UNAMID missions operated under joint command derived its authority from the UNSC and the AU Peace and Security Council. UNAMID mission statement indicated that its main priority remained its responsibility to protect. Given this assurance, it was expected that the mandate would be achieved, but, regrettably, this has not been the case in Darfur. A fully deployed UNAMID has to be strong enough to keep rebels, government and *Janjaweed* at bay and compel some of the military elements to disarm. By April 2010, UNAMID had only been able to deploy 17 157 troops and 1 812 police units in Darfur (Jibril 2010: 6). Furthermore, the organiza-

tion encountered intense resentment and mistrust on the part of the Darfur people that its members were attacked by civilians who were believed to be in league with the Sudanese government. UNAMID soldiers have been subject to frequent attacks and cold-blooded killing since the beginning of their mission in Darfur. For example, only one week after its inauguration in January 2008, UNAMID soldiers were attacked by the Government of Sudan army while they were travelling in a supply convoy in Northern Darfur State. The situation regarding the security of UNAMID's personnel deteriorated rapidly with the killing of two Egyptian soldiers in May 2010 and three Rwandans on 9 June 2010 (Jibril 2010: 7). These persistent attacks compromised the whole peace process in Darfur.

Despite the above attempts to bring peace by the UNAMID, another important role player in this regard was the European Union (EU). In Darfur the EU's role is to support the AU mission through funding. The funding is to assist in support of conflict prevention and crisis management (Derblom et al. 2008: 18). By responding to the Darfur conflict which has been raging since 2003, the EU placed itself at the forefront of international assistance efforts, through its backing up of efforts led by the AU. The EU's support included the following major components: mobilisation of funds of around • 1 billion whereby most resources have been provided for humanitarian assistance as well as other peacekeeping costs such as funds necessary for the payment of personnel costs; support for human rights inquiries and calls for an end to impunity in Darfur; support for the AU's efforts to help stabilise the situation in Darfur since January 2004. At the later stage, the EU's support started declining and funding became limited. That situation resulted in the decline of deployment of peacekeepers on the ground in Darfur. Critics argue that the EU has not done enough in the Darfur's peace process. The EU's approach to long-term actions remains very diplomacy orientated and that proved to be ineffective. If the EU wishes to effect real changes in Darfur rather than merely providing band-aid solutions of humanitarian aid, more substantial, concrete support is required from its ranks (Black and Williams 2010: 119-133).

### ***The Failures of the Darfur's Peace Process***

The Darfur peace process has thus far failed to bring a lasting peace to the violence-plagued

region of Darfur. Netabay (2009) identifies the following major factors that stymied the peace process: mutual mistrust between the Government of Sudan and rebel movements; weaknesses of the mediation process; inconsistent strategy of participation; fragmentation of the rebel movements; and the inability of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) to address the power and resource-sharing problems and security issues.

#### ▪ *Mutual Mistrust between the Government of Sudan and Rebel Movements*

According to Netabay (2009), in the context of civil war or intrastate conflict, mutual trust is a crucial factor for serious negotiations towards a sustainable peace agreement. Mutual trust ensures confidence between the actors, increases their willingness to negotiate and compromise, avoids the 'security dilemma', and helps them feel secure with the outcome of the negotiations. Darby and MacGinty (2003: 2) argue that a successful peace process requires 'that the protagonists are willing to negotiate in good faith' and 'that the negotiators are committed to a sustained process'.

#### ▪ *Weaknesses of the Mediation Process*

Netabay (2009) argues that in any peace process, mediators and external actors who influence the mediation process play a dominant role in its success or failure. Mediators become obsessed with bringing peace, which in practice means some sort of negotiated settlement. With the continued violence and conflict in Darfur, it was clear that external missions did not always promote peace.

#### ▪ *Incompetence of Mediators*

Incompetence of mediators hampered the Darfur peace process at an early stage. First, the Chadians lacked mediation experience and impartiality. For example, while mediating the first ceasefire in September 2003, Chadian President Deby skewed the negotiation process in favour of the Government of Sudan. Although the rebels and the Government of Sudan agreed to a 45 day ceasefire, it soon collapsed partly because President Deby blamed the rebels for complications. President Deby's assertive stance against the rebels undermined his credibility as a neu-

tral mediator. Furthermore, negotiations in N'Djamena collapsed because the rebels refused to negotiate further unless international observers were present. In May 2004, the AU took leadership of the peace negotiations from the Chadians. However, the AU mediators also failed to formulate a realistic and workable negotiation process. For example, the Abuja talks dealt only with security and humanitarian issues instead of addressing the daunting political and economic issues that are root causes of the conflict. This led to the collapse of the Abuja talks (Iyob and Khadiagala 2006: 156).

▪ *Misguided Mediation Strategy*

The UN and AU mediators' inconsistent mediation strategy partly undermined the Abuja peace negotiations. In most cases mediators had limited the timeframe of the negotiations by setting deadlines, so that factions did not receive enough time to solve their differences and disagreements and to thoroughly discuss and understand the document before signing it.

According to Jett (1999: 19) the following are the four criteria for measuring the success of peacekeeping: completion of the mandate; facilitation of the conflict resolution; containment of the conflict and the limitation of casualties. However, in Darfur the above mentioned mandates have not been fulfilled. The conflict, civilian casualties and displacement have increased in the presence of the AU, UNAMID and EU. From the above, it is clear that the conflict in Darfur can be dated from its ongoing political, economic and cultural marginalization since the colonial era. Therefore, one can argue that the history of such conflict is infused with ethnic and religious divides as well as economic and political discrimination. These seem to be the root causes that make peacekeeping complex in that it becomes difficult to merge development and cultural tolerance in an environment of historically entrenched hatred and violence.

Recently in April 2013, an international donor's conference on reconstruction and development in Darfur ended with donors pledging nearly \$ 3.7 billion towards 'recovery, reconstruction and development of Darfur during six years'. The bulk of the pledges came from a commitment made by the Sudanese government to contribute \$ 2.65 billion. The state of Qatar announced that it pledged \$ 500 million, and the

EU committed \$ 35 million. The United State of America (USA) being the biggest donor to Darfur through the US Agency for International Development (USAID) expressed concern over the deteriorating security situation in Darfur. The 40 countries participating in the conference overwhelmingly expressed support for the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur as a base for peace in the country (UN News Centre 8 April 2013).

## CONCLUSION

It is clear from this article that the peacekeeping missions in Darfur needed to be questioned on the basis of the roles played by the international actors. This approach helped in determining if whether peacekeeping is best placed in the hands of the international community, given the fact that the war continued to escalate in the region regardless of the degree of intervention. The key question that this article attempted to address was whether international actors were able to effectively monitor, assist and put consistent pressure on the peacekeeping processes in Darfur or not. On 9 July 2011, after over 30 years of civil war with the Government of Sudan, a new nation was born in Africa, the Republic of Sudan. Citizens of the new nation celebrated in the streets with hope of peace in the region. Unfortunately, Darfur still remains an area of injustice and despair. In spite of the presence of the UNAMID and international NGOs providing security and aid in the region, the number of Darfuri internal displaced persons (IDPs) has increased from 1.6 million to over 2 million. Darfuri refugees in Chad and the Central African Republic have increased from 200 000 to 250 000. Outside of refugee and IDP camps, Darfuri are still under attack by *Janjaweed* militia who are committing the same atrocities as they did in 2003.

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